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Abstract
The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
(PRWORA) of 1996 represents a dramatic change in the US welfare state.
One of its key goals was to move lone mothers, even those with young
children, from welfare to work. Early evidence suggests that, in concert
with a strong economy, progress has been made — welfare caseloads
have fallen dramatically and the employment rates of lone mothers have
increased substantially.
In addition to the federal reforms, state level welfare reforms
played an important role prior to 1996 and are playing an even more
important role subsequent to 1996 as PRWORA gives states
unprecedented flexibility in designing and implementing their welfare
systems. In this paper, we examine some key state-level reforms, using
evidence from selected states, to illustrate the three major types of
policies used in the US to move lone mothers from welfare to work:
mandating work (Michigan); making work pay (Michigan and
Minnesota); and helping families with child care (Illinois). We conclude
that each of these policies has a role to play in moving lone mothers
from welfare to work, but that further policies are needed if the US is to
also to do a better job of reducing child poverty.
JEL numbers: I3, J00
Keywords: welfare, lone mothers, employment
1Introduction
An increasing share of children in the US are living with lone mothers.
In 1998, 23 percent of children under the age of 18 lived with a lone
mother, up from 18 percent in 1980 and 8 percent in 1960 (see Table 1).
Although there are differences in the extent of lone parenthood across
racial and ethnic groups, the share of children living with lone mothers
has risen in all groups: from 1980 to 1998, the share of children living
with a lone mother rose from 14 to 18 percent for whites, from 44 to 51
percent for African-Americans, and from 20 to 27 percent for Hispanics
(see Table 2).1
Table 1: Living Arrangements of US Children Under Age 18, 1960 to
1998
Year Percent living with lone mother Percent living with never-married
mother
1960 8.0 0.4
1970 10.8 0.8
1980 18.0 2.9
1990 21.6 7.6
1998 23.0 9.0
Source: 1996 Green Book, Appendix G; US Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the
United States: 1999, Table No. 83.
The share of children whose mothers have never been married has
grown more rapidly (see Tables 1 and 2). In 1998, 9 percent of all
children lived with never married mothers, three times the 2.9 percent
rate in 1980 and more than twenty times the 0.4 percent rate in 1960.
Between 1980 and 1998, the share of children living with never married
mothers rose from 1 to 5 percent among whites, from 13 to 32 percent
among blacks, and from 4 to 12 percent among Hispanics. By 1998, 39
1 In the US, a child is a person below the age of 18, and a lone mother is a
mother whose marital status is either never married or previously married
(i.e., divorced, separated, or widowed). Thus, included in the count of lone
mothers are women who may be cohabiting.
2percent of children living with lone mothers were living with never
married mothers.
Table 2: Living Arrangements of Children by Racial/Ethnic Group,
1980 to 1998
Year Percent living with lone
mother
Percent living with never-
married mother
White
1980 14 1
1990 16 3
1998 18 5
African American
1980 44 13
1990 51 27
1998 51 32
Hispanic
1980 20 4
1990 27 8
1998 27 12
Source: US Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1999, Table No. 83.
Lone mothers have historically had a higher labor force
participation rate than married mothers (Burtless, 2000). However, their
participation rate has varied by marital status (see Figure 1). Until
recently, never married mothers’ participation rate was lower than that
of previously married mothers (and lower than that of married
mothers). Figure 1 shows an increase in the participation rate of lone
mothers in the late 1990s, with a particularly sharp rise for never
married mothers after the mid-1990s; their participation rate now
slightly exceeds that of married mothers.
Lone mother families have high poverty rates. In 1999, the rate for
children living in lone mother families was 42 percent, as compared to
17 percent for all families with children (US Bureau of the Census, 2000).
These high child poverty rates are often attributed to the American
social welfare system which provides a more limited range of benefits
than other Western industrialized nations and relies to a larger extent on
means-tested and targeted, rather than universal, benefits (Katz, 1996, p.
x). For instance, the US has no universal child benefit or allowance, no
3universal public health insurance, and no benefit for non-disabled
individuals who are out of work unless they have sufficient recent work
experience.
Figure 1: Labor Force Participation Rates of Women with Children,
1960 to 1998 (data from US Bureau of the Census, 1999, Table No. 659)
Three federal entitlement programs have been particularly
important for the economic well-being of lone mother families. The first,
Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), was designed for
lone mother families (but later extended to two-parent families with an
unemployed breadwinner). Until 1996, AFDC was an entitlement
program, available to any family meeting the eligibility criteria which
consisted of having low income and assets (until recently, no work or
work-related activity was required). Payment levels, set by states, have
varied widely by state and over time, but have tended to be low; in no
state and year have AFDC benefits been sufficient to raise family
incomes above the poverty line. A second federal entitlement program,
Food Stamps, provides coupons for purchasing food to low-income
individuals and families. Single-mother families receiving AFDC are
automatically eligible for Food Stamps. In states with low AFDC benefit
levels, Food Stamps play an important role in raising family incomes,
although still not above the poverty line. A third federal entitlement,
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4Medicaid, provides health insurance coverage to low-income
individuals and families. In addition, there are a few smaller entitlement
programs in which some lone-mother families participate (for instance,
the Supplemental Security Income program for disabled individuals).
A number of discretionary programs also provide support to some
lone-mother families. The Women, Infants, and Children program
provides food coupons for low-income pregnant women and women
with infants; various housing assistance programs provide rent
subsidies or places in public housing for low-income families; and the
Head Start program, discussed further below, provides pre-school
education to children from low-income families.
The 1990s saw major changes in US welfare policies. At the
national level, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PRWORA) ended the federal entitlement to
cash assistance and replaced the previously open-ended funding for the
AFDC program with capped block grant funding for a new time-limited
cash assistance program, called Temporary Assistance to Needy
Families (TANF). PRWORA sought to reduce welfare dependency by
mandating work or employment-related activities as a condition of
receiving welfare, even for lone mothers with small children. It gave
states the autonomy to change program rules, including reforms that
make combining welfare and work more attractive, and greatly
expanded funding for child care for women engaging in employment-
related activities, combining welfare with work, or leaving welfare for
work (for a review of PRWORA’s provisions, see Pavetti, 2000).
As federal welfare reform was being implemented, other federal
reforms designed to make work more attractive for low-income single
mothers were passed. The Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), greatly
expanded in 1993, is an important source of income for women leaving
welfare for work. The federal minimum wage was raised in 1993, and
health insurance benefits were extended to more low-income children
through the 1997 Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP). By the
late 1990s, in most states, a lone mother would be financially better off
working than remaining a non-working welfare recipient – the welfare
trap had been sprung.
Welfare reforms at the state level have been even more far-
reaching. The impetus for federal reform came from state experiments
that followed a previous welfare reform, the Family Support Act of 1988.
A “waiver” process allowed states to seek permission to make
fundamental program changes, such as imposing time limits and
requiring work. Waivers began under the Bush administration and
5accelerated during the Clinton administration. By 1996, 46 states had
been granted waivers.
After PRWORA passed, states took advantage of the new
flexibility in TANF. For instance, while the federal law sets a five-year
time limit for receipt of cash assistance, states may set shorter time
limits. Most adopted the federal lifetime limit, but practices vary widely.
For example, Tennessee maintains a five-year cap; it also terminates
benefits after 18 months of receipt and does not allow families to reapply
for assistance until another three months have passed. Another 16 states
set time limits shorter than 60 months, ranging from 21 months in
Connecticut to 48 months in Florida and Georgia. Less than 10 states
plan to provide assistance beyond federal limits, although nearly all
states have extension and exemption policies to the time limit (Gallagher
et al., 1998). Likewise, while the federal law requires recipients to work
within two years of welfare receipt, 20 states (plus the District of
Columbia) require engagement in work or a work-related activity at the
time they apply for assistance or within the first three months of receipt
(National Governors’ Association Center for Best Practices, 1999).
States must impose financial penalties – “sanctions” — for
recipients who do not comply with the work requirements. These
penalties range from immediate withdrawal of the family’s full benefits
(used by 16 states), to withdrawal of a portion of the family’s benefits (12
states plus the District of Columbia), to gradual withdrawal of benefits
(22 states) (US General Accounting Office, 2000). Seven states impose
“lifetime” sanctions when recipients are in continued non-compliance –
such sanctions function like the time limits, but with recipients
potentially terminated sooner. Sanctions may be affecting more families
than the time limits.
These reforms were designed to move lone mothers into work —
by mandating work, making work pay, and helping with child care —
and the evidence suggests that they did just that. Between 1994 and
1999, the national welfare caseload was reduced by half, from 5 million
cases to just 2.5 million, and recipients as a percentage of the US
population fell from 5.5 to 2.3 percent (US Department of Health and
Human Services, 2000). Over the same period, the labor force
participation of all lone mothers increased by 10 percentage points (see
Figure 1); the participation of never married mothers (the group of lone
mothers most likely be have been on welfare) increased more than 15
points (from under 50 percent in 1990 to 65 percent by 1998). By 1997,
the participation rate of never married mothers with pre-school age
children exceeded that of married mothers with pre-school age children
6for the first time in the thirty-plus years that such statistics have been
published; and the participation rate of all lone mothers exceeded that of
married mothers for the first time since 1987 (Burtless, 2000).
Although the strong economy played a role, analysts agree that
welfare reform was responsible for a substantial part of this increased
employment (see, Danziger, ed., 1999). McKernan et al. (2000) tested the
impact of ten state welfare policies on the employment rate of lone
mothers and found that eight — raising hours of work requirements,
reducing days of assistance before work requirement, reducing
maximum months of benefits, increasing percent of benefits lost on first
sanction, increasing months of transitional child care benefits, excluding
the value of a vehicle from asset limits, raising the total asset limit, and
changing the way housing assistance was treated — significantly
increased lone mothers’ employment but had no effect on the
employment of single women without children (a group that should not
have been affected by welfare reforms).
This evidence suggests that state level reforms contributed to the
increased lone mothers’ employment in the 1990s, although the increases
would have been smaller if unemployment rates had been higher and if
the minimum wage and EITC had not been increased. Therefore, we
now examine some key state-level reforms, using evidence from selected
states to illustrate the three major types of policies that have been used
in the US to move lone mothers from welfare to work: mandating work
(Michigan); making work pay (Michigan and Minnesota); and helping
families with child care (Illinois).
These kinds of policies are complementary. A strategy to move
women from welfare to work and out of poverty will be most effective if
it combines elements from all three. We consider them separately in the
sections that follow because states treat these as distinct policy areas and
because this framework facilitates comparison with different policies in
other countries. Although our focus is on the impact of welfare reform
on lone mothers’ employment, these policies may also affect child and
family well-being. We briefly consider those issues as well.
Mandating Work
Prior to the 1996 reform, there were many exemptions from participation
in work and training activities. Now, nearly all recipients must engage
in “work activities” within two years of receiving assistance.
Furthermore, states must meet work participation requirements—each
7year, an increasingly larger share of the caseload must work. ‘Work’ is
defined as subsidized or unsubsidized employment, community service,
on-the-job training, participation in job search or job search readiness
activities (limited to 6 weeks in a year and no more than 4 weeks
consecutively per participant), or participation in short-term vocational
training.2
States have also adopted policies to make work more attractive to
recipients. Prior to PRWORA, after four months of work, recipients
could expect nearly a dollar reduction in benefits for every dollar
earned. Now states can set their own policies. A number have expanded
this “earned income disregard,” allowing recipients to keep some of
their benefits as earnings increase. (We return to this issue in the section,
“Making Work Pay”.)
Overall, states now have more discretion in designing TANF
programs than they did under AFDC. This flexibility is constrained to
some extent by federal work requirements and by bureaucratic inertia.
Most states have adopted a “Work First” approach to move recipients
into the labor force. Such programs assume that finding a job and
developing work skills through direct experience — rather than
participating in education and training — is the best strategy for finding
work.
Some states have intensified efforts to divert applicants from
receiving cash welfare and entering the welfare rolls. This practice,
called diversion, may be accomplished through: 1) providing one-time
financial assistance; 2) requiring mandatory job search as a condition of
eligibility; and/or 3) linking applicants to other services or resources.
Three-fifths of states use diversion activities, with lump sum payments
and/or mandatory upfront job search being the most common (Maloy et
al., 1998). An applicant accepting a lump sum payment is ineligible to
receive TANF for some specified period. Mandatory job search prior to
eligibility determination seeks to direct job-ready applicants into work.
Referring applicants to other services in lieu of cash benefits is driven by
beliefs that cash assistance should be a last resort and that services
provide a better way of promoting work.
2 No more than 20 percent of the caseload can participate in vocational training
and count toward the ‘work’ participation rate.
8The Importance of Implementation
The policies enumerated thus far are written into state law or policy
manuals. How policies are implemented is determined by decisions
made by those carrying out the day-to-day work. The increased state
flexibility, coupled with the emphasis on work, has transformed the role
of the welfare office and the functions of staff from providing benefits to
supporting work. Welfare office staff now have greater discretion than
prior to 1996. How that discretion gets used has an enormous effect on
clients. In some states, the probability of being sanctioned varies
significantly by local office (Fein & Wang, 1999). The definition of “non-
compliance” may also matter. For example, in Michigan, a client not
cooperating with the Work First program may have her grant reduced. If
that same client is working and quits working, her grant may be
terminated. In Wisconsin, for each hour a client does not participate in
an assigned activity, her check is reduced by the hourly minimum wage.
If she does not participate at all, she may receive no grant. In states
requiring job search as part of the application process, the amount of
assistance given to applicants could affect entry into the system; if
applicants are provided little or no guidance during their search, they
may give up and never become eligible for cash assistance.
The trend toward contracting out for services has accelerated since
PRWORA. Many states have privatized parts of the welfare system,
particularly the job search and placement functions. Greater
privatization could have far-reaching consequences for clients. Concerns
about accountability, withholding services (e.g., due to profit motive),
and dissimilar services across providers are amplified when a private
agency is involved.
Recipient Process in Michigan
In Michigan, families apply for TANF, called the Family Independence
Program (FIP), at one of more than 100 Family Independence Agency
(FIA) offices across the state. Most offices take applications on a walk-in
basis in the morning hours. The applicant, typically a lone mother,
receives a combined application form (for food stamps, medical
assistance, child care and cash benefits) and must show documentation
for sources of income, employment, citizenship and birth certificates,
school registration and local address. She must cooperate with child
support requirements and help identify the father of her children. The
applicant is usually seen by the Family Independence Specialist (FIS)
worker who goes over eligibility information, discusses policies and
rules, and focuses on requirements of the Work First program.
9Within two weeks, she must attend a Work First orientation
session run jointly by the welfare agency and Work First program staff,
where program rules and work requirements are detailed. Availability
of child care and employment and training options are mentioned
during orientation. Attendance at orientation is part of the application
process; if she does not attend, she will not receive cash assistance. If she
attends orientation and the first day of Work First activities and is
financially eligible, the FIS opens her case.
The client and her FIS also develop a Personal Responsibility Plan
and Family Contract, outlining her goals and responsibilities and what
the program will provide to help meet those goals. The plan may
include goals such as finding employment through Work First, or
returning to school for further training. This plan is initiated within the
first two months of her receiving assistance and may be modified,
particularly when the client meets with her worker.
State policy requires that FIS workers make quarterly home visits.
If the recipient falls into sanction status (for noncompliance), home visits
are on a monthly basis. The home call is designated to build a trusting
relationship between the client and the worker so that the client will
discuss family concerns. The workers rely on informal interaction and
client self-disclosure to uncover any employment barriers. Formal
diagnostic or structured assessment tools are not used.
Unless the client is already employed for at least 20 hours a week
at the minimum wage (or more, depending on the ages of her children
and her marital status), she must attend a Work First program. She will
be exempt from the work requirement only if she has a disabling health
problem or cares for a family member with a health problem, has a
newborn less than 3 months of age, is a teen parent attending school, or
is over age 65. During 1997, about 20 percent of the caseload was
deferred from work requirements and between 36 and 56 percent of
recipients reported earnings from work, with the remainder (between
one-half and one-quarter) of cases expected to be searching for work. By
1999, the proportion of the caseload deferred averaged 42 percent,
growing each month. This is due to continued declines in the caseload.3
The proportion of cases with earnings averaged around 33 percent.
Once in Work First, the types of assistance and the sequencing of
services she would receive vary, depending on the program model
3 The number of deferred cases has remained around 32,000 while the total
caseload declined from approximately 155,000 at the beginning of 1997 to
about 77,000 at the end of 1999.
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chosen by the local provider. In 1998, for the most part, Michigan’s 83
Work First programs conform to one of four different approaches that
vary along a continuum of formal services.4
At one end of the spectrum are 20 programs in which the client
participates for approximately one week in structured “job search
readiness” activities, such as resume and letter preparation and mock
interviews. She would also attend workshops on topics relevant for job
retention and life skills, such as anger management and budgeting. At
the same time or during the next week, she would search for work. To
assist her job search, she has access to free telephones to call employers,
newspaper ads, and lists of job openings culled from the state
employment agency. Additionally, program staff may call employers on
her behalf, supply her with leads on jobs, bring employers to the Work
First site for interviews, and/or take her for interviews with potential
employers.
The largest group of Work First programs, three-eighths, provide
either formal job search workshops or specialized direction and support
in job search, but not both. Ten programs offer workshops on a variety
of topics, covering job seeking, retention and life skills, but provide less
staff assistance during the direct job search phase. The other 21 offer
workshops related to job search skills or provide workshop activities
only to clients who do not find a job within the first week or two of
being in the program. However, in these programs, the agency provides
a full array of specialized job search services, linking directly clients with
employers.
Another one quarter of the providers offer primarily instruction on
job search techniques in the workshops. The agency supplies job
postings and access to job listings, but clients are responsible for making
direct contacts with employers and arrangements for interviews.
Finally, 5 of the 83 programs offer few structured services. They
assist clients with resume preparation and provide listings of open jobs,
but group workshops are rare, and job search efforts are primarily the
client’s responsibility. These programs are in rural areas, so group
activities may not be feasible.
These latter two types of Work First programs reflect a belief that
it is best for a client to find a job on her own. Two reasons are cited:
clients may be more likely to stay in jobs they found for themselves, as
opposed to ones “given” to them by staff, and clients need to learn the
4 Two programs could not be categorized using this scheme.
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skills of job search, so that they can conduct future searches. The other
program models, in which staff assist clients during the job search,
assume that clients have certain disadvantages (in their ability to
conduct a job search and/or their qualifications) compared to other job
seekers and therefore need more assistance in securing employment.5
Clients unable to find work within four weeks may still be
required to search for work or may be placed in a work experience
position or a vocational training class. If, however, a woman drops out
of the program or is otherwise determined non-compliant, her case will
be sent back to FIA for review. If the caseworker finds that she does not
have a legitimate reason for not cooperating, her benefits will be
reduced by 25 percent. After four months, if she continues to be out of
compliance, her case will be closed. If she is a new applicant, she must
demonstrate compliance within the first 60 days of case opening or she
can be dropped from the rolls immediately.
If this client gets a job, Work First will check at 30 day intervals to
see if she remains employed, up to the 90th day on the job or for as long
as the client remains on assistance. If she loses her job and is still on cash
assistance, she will be re-referred by her FIS worker to Work First and
start the process of job search again.
Assessment of Work First
Michigan’s Work First program is similar to that of many of the states.
Local administrators in Michigan generally express support for the
mandatory labor force attachment model (Danziger and Seefeldt, 2000),
but they raise concerns about how well this program model works for
recipients. Work First managers identify both structural and personal
impediments to success. However, few programs systematically
evaluate recipients for depression, domestic violence, or other personal
problems, much less provide referrals or access to service providers to
treat the problems (for a review of barriers to work, see Danziger et al.,
2000). Some problems which managers cite as impediments to
employment that are also common among recipients — transportation
needs, child care problems, low sense of personal mastery and lack of
job skills — are sometimes targeted for services. Most programs provide
child care subsidies, along with vouchers for public transportation or
vans; lack of work experience, self esteem and soft skills are the target of
5 Due to the manner in which data is kept in Michigan (regionally, rather than
by Work First agency) we are unable to determine if one of the four Work
First program models is more effective at moving clients into jobs.
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some workshops and job search strategies. In contrast, health and
mental health problems are not usually assessed or treated, and
educational pursuits are not generally supported as alternatives to or
substitutes for employment. As welfare rolls continue to decline, it is
likely that the proportion of the caseload with these problems will
increase.
Given the needs of welfare recipients and current program design,
in what directions might the Work First model be improved? First,
applicants would be assessed and referred for services for health and
mental health problems and perhaps would receive treatment prior to
job search. Because managers realize that such problems make people
hard to employ, some recipients might be allowed to fulfill their work
requirement by participating in treatment.6 In at least two states, Oregon
and Utah, welfare-to-work programs are staffed with mental health
professionals who provide counseling services and referrals to treatment
programs (Johnson and Meckstroth, 1998).
Second, clients with few work skills, little prior work experience,
and educational deficiencies might be referred for more intensive
training. While long-term investments in education and training are not
allowable under PRWORA, participation in a short-term job training is
allowed. In Michigan, the Work First program now allows clients to
participate in “condensed vocational training,” no longer than six
months in duration, or to combine work with training or participation in
high school equivalency (GED) preparation. However, GED preparation
does not count toward work participation rates (except in the case of
teen-aged recipients).
Programs also could provide financial assistance for clients’ auto
purchases and repairs. A new federal program “Access to Jobs and
Reverse Commute Program,” operated through the US Department of
Transportation, has the goal of improving transportation options for
welfare recipients.
Mandating work and job search, in the context of the economic
boom of the 1990s, moved many recipients into the work force.
However, many have moved into low skill, low paying jobs. The
reforms to the mandated work approach suggested here would, if
successful, do a better job in promoting the broader goals of job
retention, job growth, and increased family well-being.
6 While these activities do not count toward the federal work participation
requirement, states are not precluded from assigning clients to non-work
activities.
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Making Work Pay
In late 2000, the entitlement to cash assistance had ended and welfare
rolls had declined more than most analysts had predicted when the
reform was passed. PRWORA did not, however, transform the cash-
based safety net of AFDC into an effective work-based safety net —
there is no guarantee that a lone mother who seeks work but cannot find
a job will receive any cash assistance or any opportunity to work in
return for assistance.
As mentioned above, however, PRWORA gave states great
latitude in setting welfare rules related to how the earnings of welfare
recipients affect their cash assistance payments. As a result, more than
40 states have changed their rules to do more to “make work pay.” Most
have eliminated the “welfare trap” that previously existed–i.e. between
1981 and 1996, most single mothers experienced a decline in net income
if they went from being a nonworking welfare recipient to a part-time
worker at the minimum wage.
This disincentive resulted from the fact that once a welfare
recipient worked for four months, benefits were reduced by one dollar
for every dollar earned. And, many women lost Medicaid when they
went to work. Thus, single mothers were faced with the choice of
receiving welfare or working, and many “chose” welfare, both because it
allowed them to stay home with their children, and because work did
not pay.
PRWORA’s strict work requirements no longer allow a single
mother to chose to stay home with her children, but the law no longer
prevents a state from supplementing her low earnings with cash
assistance. For example, in Michigan, a woman must work once her
youngest child is three months or take part in work-related activities for
at least 20 hours per week–she can not choose to stay at home with her
baby. However, Michigan now allows her to keep her first $200 in
monthly earnings and 20 percent of the remainder; California has a $225
disregard and allows her to keep 50 percent of the remainder; Illinois
disregards 67 percent of her earnings (Gallagher et al., 1998). In
Michigan, a single mother of two children who does not work can
receive a maximum cash benefit of $489 per month. If she works 30
hours per week at the minimum wage ($5.15 per hour), she will earn
about $670 per month. Under the new earnings disregard she will
receive $113 per month in cash assistance in addition to her earnings.
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In addition to welfare reform, there has been a major change
outside of welfare that also increases the financial rewards of work. The
Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), enacted in 1975, provides all working
poor families with a refundable income tax credit (i.e., the family
receives a payment from the Internal Revenue Service if the credit due
exceeds the income tax owed). The EITC raises the effective wage of
low-income families, is available to both one- and two-parent families,
and does not require them to apply for welfare. The maximum annual
EITC for a poor family was $953 in 1990. After several legislative
increases, the maximum EITC for families with two or more children
was $3,756 in 1998; it was $2,272 for families with one child. A single
mother with two children earning $670 per month would receive an
EITC of about $3,000 per year.
In addition, in 1986 a woman leaving welfare for work and her
children would have lost medical coverage, but by 1997, her children
would remain eligible for government paid health insurance because of
a post-PRWORA program, the Children’s Health Insurance Program.
Danziger, Heflin and Corcoran (2001) document that it pays to
move from welfare to work in Michigan. They analyze data from a
sample of about 700 women who received welfare in February 1997 and
were interviewed in Fall 1997 and Fall 1998. Respondents reported, for
the month before the interview, work hours, earnings, welfare receipt,
and income from a variety of sources. Respondents were also asked
about work-related child care and transportation expenses. In addition
to the reported income sources, the study imputed the value of federal
and state income taxes, the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) and the
employee’s share of Social Security taxes.
The authors classified the women by their work/welfare status —
wage-reliant women were those who reported earnings, but no cash
welfare income (43.6 percent of the sample at the second wave, 1998);
combiners were those who reported both earnings and cash welfare in
the interview month (27.1 percent of the sample); welfare-reliant
mothers were those who received welfare but no earnings (20.4 percent);
the final category included those who were neither working nor
receiving cash welfare (8.9 percent).
When Danziger, Heflin and Corcoran take all these income sources
and the EITC into account and subtract taxes and work-related child
care and transportation expenses, they find that the average net monthly
income was $1,677 for wage-reliant mothers, $1,449 for combiners,
$1,027 for welfare-reliant mothers and $1,178 for those not working and
not receiving welfare. Working mothers have, on average, higher
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incomes than welfare mothers. Wage-reliant mothers had an average net
income 63 percent higher than that of welfare reliant mothers, and
women combining work and welfare had a net income 41 percent higher
than that of the welfare-reliant. Thus, in Michigan it does now pay to
move from welfare to work.7
Nonetheless, poverty remains high for these single mothers after
welfare reform — the monthly poverty rate for all respondents was 53.5
percent (the official US 1998 federal poverty threshold for a household of
that size is divided by 12); 38.4 percent of wage-reliant mothers, 53.0
percent of combiners, 83.3 percent of welfare-reliant mothers and 68
percent of those who were neither working nor received welfare were
poor. The good news is that poverty is much lower for workers than for
nonworkers. The bad news is that poverty remains very high for
workers, and the annual poverty rate would be even higher than these
numbers indicate because most wage-reliant women do not work, and
hence do not earn this much, in every month.
Similar results are evident from the Minnesota Family Investment
Program (MFIP), which was evaluated in a randomized demonstration
by the Manpower Demonstration Research Corporation (this summary
is based on Berlin, 2000). For long-term welfare recipients, MFIP
increased the welfare benefit by 20 percent for those who took a job and
allowed recipients to keep 38 percent of every dollar earned. It also
required long-term recipients who were not working at least 30 hours
per week to participate in job search or other work requirements. Thus,
MFIP anticipated the kind of welfare reform that has evolved in most
states after 1996 — increased work requirements to boost work effort
and increased work incentives to make work pay.
According to the MDRC evaluation (Knox et al., 2000), the
percentage of single-parent long-term program participants who
worked in an average quarter (in the first 9 quarters after the program
began) was about 50 percent, compared to 37 percent of the controls. The
poverty rate was about 75 percent for the treatment group, but 85
7 Detailed monthly income data for all respondents for February 1997 when the
sample was drawn are not available. At that time, all respondents were
receiving cash welfare, and about 40% were working, and the variance in
monthly income was likely to be a lot smaller than it was at the Fall 1998
interview. In work in progress, the authors attempt to correct for selection
effects and still find that those who have moved from welfare to work have
greater income increases than those who remain as nonworking welfare
recipients.
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percent for the controls. Unlike the data from the Michigan sample,
these data do not include income from other household earners, an
estimated value of taxes and the earned income tax credit, or a measure
of work-related expenses. But, the results are similar – welfare reforms
that increase work requirements and work incentives improve the
situation of welfare recipients, but more must be done if poverty is to be
reduced.
Thus, in a booming economy, most welfare recipients can find
some work but many do not escape poverty. The economic incentives
now in place are in accord with the goals of policy planners — on
average, wage-reliant mothers and those combining work and welfare
are economically better off than welfare-reliant mothers. These results
also suggest that more attention should be paid to factors that prevent
those remaining welfare-reliant from going to work. The new economic
incentives and the increased pressure to leave welfare make it unlikely
that many lone mothers are rejecting work and choosing to stay on
welfare. Rather, many of them have problems, such as poor physical
and/or mental health or lack of job skills, which prevent them from
getting and keeping jobs even when unemployment rates are low (S. K.
Danziger et al., 2000).
In the aftermath of welfare reform, many welfare-reliant mothers
are at high risk of losing cash assistance benefits due to sanctions and/or
impending time limits. And, in many states, mothers combining work
and welfare are also at risk of losing benefits due to time limits. Now
that it is economically beneficial to move from welfare to work, there
remains a need for additional policies to make work pay enough so that
a greater percentage of working mothers can escape poverty and for
enhanced policies to help welfare-reliant mothers move into regular jobs
or into subsidized employment.
The law now requires lone parents who have no serious
impairments to take personal responsibility and look for work.
However, PRWORA absolves the state of any responsibility — even if a
woman diligently searches for work without finding a job, her cash
assistance can be terminated. At a minimum, lone mothers should be
offered an opportunity to perform community service in return for
continued cash assistance. A more costly option, but one that would
have a greater antipoverty impact, would be to provide low-wage public
service jobs of last resort. Welfare recipients who were willing to work
could then combine wages with the Earned Income Tax Credit and
support their families even when there was little employer demand for
their skills.
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If we are to reduce poverty as well as the welfare caseload, we
must demonstrate greater willingness to spend public funds to complete
the task of turning a cash-based safety net into a work-oriented safety
net. For recipients with the most extensive personal problems as
mentioned in the previous section, this requires an expansion of social
service and treatment programs, but also merits experimentation with
supported work programs, where participants work in closely
supervised settings.
Helping Families With Child Care
The federal government and states have greatly expanded their
investment in child care since PRWORA was enacted. The Act
consolidated federal funding into a child care and development block
grant (CCDBG); 20 billion dollars were allocated for the period 1997 to
2002, reflecting a 25 percent increase (an additional four billion dollars)
over the spending provided under prior legislation (US House of
Representatives, Committee on Ways and Means, 1998). States can
increase spending further by shifting federal funds out of their TANF
block grants. Additionally, states were given new flexibility in designing
subsidy systems.
As a result, state child care systems are now more varied than ever
before. In this section, we use data from Illinois to illustrate one state’s
policies. Illinois is a large state that has greatly increased child care
spending since PRWORA, but still faces challenges in meeting the child
care needs of lone mothers. Illinois is not representative of other states.
As we shall see below, it is one of few states to guarantee child care
assistance to low-income families; it has made a somewhat higher level
of investment in child care than other states; and it is one of few states
that contract directly with child care providers. (For an overview of child
care developments in all states, see Blank and Poersch, 2000.)
Policies that help families find and pay for adequate non-parental
child care can facilitate the employment of lone mothers. All else equal,
mothers facing lower child care costs are more likely to be employed,
particularly low-income or single mothers (Han and Waldfogel, 2000).
Low-income single mothers also report being more likely to work when
care is more available (Mason and Kuhlthau, 1992) and when they are
more satisfied with the quality of care (Meyers, 1993). Problems with
child care can lead lone mothers to leave jobs and can also adversely
affect attendance, work hours, and career advancement.
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In addition, the quality of child care may influence child outcomes.
When child care is of high quality, children gain cognitively and socio-
emotionally (NICHD Early Child Care Research Network, 1999 and in
press). However, the quality of care in most settings in the US is only
poor to fair, with children from low-income or single-mother families
the least likely to attend high-quality day care centers, unless they are
fortunate enough to get a subsidized space in a private day care center
or in an especially good Head Start center (Head Start is the federal
government’s early education program for low-income three and four
year olds) (Galinsky et al., 1994). Thus, it is important to consider both
how to make child care more affordable and accessible and how to
improve its quality.
Policies to make child care affordable and accessible include:
providing subsidies; giving families choices to use the subsidies;
expanding the supply of care, so that care is available at the hours
families need it; and integrating welfare and non-welfare subsidies, so
that families do not lose their subsidy when they leave welfare for work.
There are also ways to enhance the quality of care. We consider these
aspects of child care policy in Illinois.
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Providing Subsidies
Every state sets its own policies for child care subsidies. Typically, states
set eligibility criteria (including a family income cut-off, expressed as an
amount in dollars, or a percentage of the poverty line or of the state’s
median income, and a requirement that the parent be working or
participating in education or training) and then provide subsidies to a
subset of eligible families, depending on the availability of funds. Prior
to PRWORA, welfare recipients or former welfare recipients had
priority, but this is no longer required under the federal law (although it
is still often the case in practice).
Illinois had this kind of policy until 1997. Now, any family whose
income falls below 50 percent of the state’s median income (and who
meets the other eligibility criteria) is guaranteed a child care subsidy. To
make the guarantee feasible, Illinois dropped its family income cut-off,
from $26,230 to $21,819 for a family of three (Adams and Schulman,
1998), and thus has a relatively low income cut-off (50 percent of state
median income and roughly 155 percent of the 1999 federal poverty line)
compared to other states (whose cut-offs range 50 to 85 percent of the
state median income and from 125 to 255 percent of the poverty line)
(State Policy Documentation Project, 1999). Illinois recently implicitly
raised its cut-off by disregarding the first 10 percent of a family’s
earnings in computing income eligibility.
Illinois is one of only 5 states that guarantee a subsidy to low-
income families. The others are Iowa, whose cut-off is 155 percent of the
federal poverty line; Kansas, at 185 percent; Rhode Island, at 225
percent; and Wisconsin, at 165 percent (State Policy Documentation
Project, 1999).
The guarantee provides a powerful message to low-income
women with children — “There are no waiting lists. All families who fall
within the income categories for their family size are eligible”
(“Affordable Child Care” brochure, Illinois Department of Human
Services (DHS)). As the public becomes more aware of this guarantee,
the share of eligible families, many of whom will never have received
welfare, using subsidies will likely increase.
Unfortunately, only limited information on subsidy use is
currently available. A study of welfare leavers, interviewed in late 1998,
found that 36 percent received a child care subsidy, but that 31 percent
reported problems paying for child care (Julnes and Halter, 1999). We do
not know what share of other low-income women are receiving
subsidies or how the rates of subsidy receipt have changed over time.
Evidence from other states suggests that rates of subsidy use have been
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surprisingly low, possibly because women are not receiving information
about subsidies or think that they are not eligible, find applying too
difficult, or perceive that waiting lists are too long (Meyers and Heintze,
1999; US Department of Health and Human Services, Child Care
Bureau, 1999).
In addition to eligibility criteria, the rate at which providers are
reimbursed affects the use of subsidies. If a provider accepts a state-
subsidized client, it must accept this price for its services (although if its
regular rate is higher, it may in some states ask the parent to make up
the difference). Illinois now pays up to the 75th percentile of the “market
rate,” similar to most other states. In fiscal year 1999, 81 percent of child
care providers in Illinois said that they would accept a subsidized client,
up from 60 percent the prior year (Ramsburg and Montanelli, 2000)
when its rate had been as low as the 43rd percentile of the market rate in
some communities (Adams and Schulman, 1998).
States also set co-payment policies. Consistent with standard
practice, Illinois requires a family to make a small co-payment, which
varies according to the family’s income. Co-payments for one child
range from $1 per week for the poorest families to $31 per week for
those with incomes close to the income cut-off for eligibles. Co-
payments do not vary according to the cost of the care. Child advocates
consider this important, as it does not create incentives for families to
choose lower cost forms of care.
As welfare caseloads have fallen and as more single mothers have
gone to work, Illinois’ spending on child care and the numbers of
children served have grown dramatically. Total spending on child care
grew from $187 million in fiscal year 1995 to a projected $656 million in
fiscal year 2001, while the numbers of children served each month grew
from 65,000 to a projected 218,000 over the same time period (see Table
3). Although data on the share of children in low-income lone mother
families being served are not available, the increase must be large as
well.
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Table 3: Child Care Spending and Numbers of Children Served in
Illinois, 1995 to 2001
Year Annual spending (in $, millions) Children served (per month)
1995 187 65,000
1996 226 82,000
1997 263 92,000
1998 307 115,000
1999 448 154,000
2000 591 195,000
2001 656 218,000
Source: “DHS Child Care,” DHS Division of Transitional Services,
www.state.il.us/agency/dhs.budget/overview/transsvc.pdf.
Giving Families Choices
Illinois, like other states, reimburses child care arranged by families, as
well as care delivered by contracted providers. Most subsidized families
select a provider and then work with a local “child care resource and
referral agency” (a non-profit organization that helps families locate
child care and that in Illinois also administers the subsidy) to set up the
reimbursement. Parents can choose any type of care — a child care
center, family day care home, or care provided in their own home or in a
relative’s home — and any specific provider, so long as space is
available and the provider meets licensing requirements. Providers bill
the state once a month, and checks are issued about three weeks later.
About one in six subsidized families use care delivered by providers
(typically, large day care centers) that have contracts with the state to
provide a certain number of slots at an agreed-upon rate. (Illinois is
unusual in this regard, as states have tended to move away from
contracts to voucher type systems).
Illinois notes, “This dual system provides families with the
freedom to choose from a variety of child care settings to best meet the
needs of both parents and children” (“Child Care” brochure, Illinois
DHS, 2000). However, choices are constrained by the supply of care
available. If there are shortages of care of particular types or for children
of particular ages or at particular hours, allowing parents to choose may
not ensure that parents’ and children’s needs are met. There may also be
shortages in particular neighborhoods or communities (Julnes and
Halter, 1999).
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Expanding Supply
Illinois, like most states, has historically had a limited supply of certain
types of care (Adams and Schulman, 1998), especially care for infants
and toddlers, and care during night and weekend hours. Demand for
these types of care has grown since welfare reform. For instance, the
number of families seeking toddler care doubled from 1997 to 1999,
while the number of families requesting weekend care increased by
more than 50 percent (Ramsburg and Montanelli, 2000). To address
supply shortfalls, the state now offers incentives to providers. For
instance, licensed providers who make 25 percent of their slots available
to children under two, and who reserve half of those slots for subsidized
children, are reimbursed at a 10 percent higher rate for the children they
serve under the age of two. Incentives are also offered to licensed
providers who agree to stay open at nights and on weekends.
Integrating Welfare and Non-Welfare Services
There is a tension in child care policy between targetting services to
welfare recipients and making services more universally available, so
that families are not denied benefits simply because they leave welfare
or did not receive welfare in the first place. Prior to PRWORA, federal
policy required states to guarantee child care to working recipients;
other families could be served only to the extent that funds remained.
PRWORA gave states the flexibility to design their own policies. Many
states continue to give current and former welfare recipients priority,
thus setting up competition between them and low-income families who
have not been welfare recipients. Illinois, as noted above, guarantees a
subsidy to any family whose income falls below 50 percent of the state’s
median income, without regard to welfare receipt. And because the
subsidies are administered by child care resource and referral agencies
or contracted providers, applicants need not have any contact with the
welfare department. Indeed, non-welfare families now make up the
majority of subsidy recipients — their share increased from 46 to 57
percent from 1998 to 1999 (Ramsburg and Montanelli, 2000).
Quality Enhancements
Although the quality of care in many settings is poor or mediocre
(Galinsky et al., 1994; Helburn (ed.), 1995; NICHD Early Child Care
Research Network, 1999), little is known about the quality of care being
used by the children of women leaving welfare. Few studies of welfare
leavers have measured child care quality (Fuller and Kagan, 2000). With
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regard to the type of care, women leaving welfare for work are more
likely to use informal care (such as care by a friend or relative) than
formal care (such as care in a day care center or licensed day care home);
and women who do not have a subsidy are the least likely to use center-
based care. However, we do not know whether this reflects the fact that
they could not afford center-based care, or that they preferred to use a
friend or relative.
Data on the quality and type of care being used in Illinois are
sparse as well. Most subsidy recipients make their own arrangements,
with only about one sixth using contracted centers. About two-thirds of
subsidy recipients use informal types of care, with 41 percent using
relatives and 25 percent using in-home care (Piecyk, Collins, and
Kreader, 1999).
Illinois is attempting to improve child care quality through
increased funding. In fiscal year 2000, Illinois spent $27 million on
quality enhancement efforts, up from $7 million two years earlier
(“Child Care”, Illinois DHS, 2000). A major quality enhancement effort
involves making Head Start more accessible to the children of employed
mothers. Head Start has long provided fairly high-quality care for
children of low-income lone mothers. However, because Head Start
programs are typically part-day programs and are not open year-round,
using them has been a problem for employed mothers. Illinois is
spending nearly $8 million each year to enable selected Head Start
programs to open full-day and full-year and focus on the children of
employed mothers. Illinois is also spending about $1.5 million in fiscal
year 2001 on a program to monitor the child care delivered by relatives
or provided in-home (this kind of care, which is exempt from licensing,
serves about two-thirds of the children funded by subsidies). Illinois will
also spend $2.4 million in fiscal year 2001 (up from $1.4 million the prior
year) on the TEACH (Teacher Education and Compensation Helps)
program (imported from North Carolina), which offers family or center-
based child care providers funding to attend college, and financial
incentives to stay on as providers after they complete the program.
Assessing Illinois’ Experience with Child Care
Illinois’ experience suggests that a state can develop a more coherent
policy and play a more active role in the child care market. Illinois has
greatly increased spending to lower costs to make more care available,
and to improve the quality of care. It is one of only a few states that
guarantee a child care subsidy to low-income families. To support this
policy, Illinois has greatly increased state funding for child care but it
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has also targeted its funding to families below a relatively low income
cut-off.
Unfortunately, we do not know as much as we would like about
how effective these efforts are. Lone mothers’ employment has increased
rapidly in Illinois and in other states, but we do not know how
important child care has been in driving that increase. Few studies have
examined the impact of child care policies on employment after welfare
reform, and they have not examined specific child care policies or
impacts on child outcomes. Bainbridge, Meyers, and Waldfogel (2000)
find that increased government expenditures on child care subsidies
account for only a small share of the increase in lone mothers’ weekly
employment post welfare reform
Lessons From the US Experience
Welfare reform has been more successful than most policy analysts
anticipated when the 1996 Act was signed. Bolstered by a strong
economy and a surge of federal funding to the states, welfare reform has
contributed to large declines in the welfare rolls and increased work
among lone mothers and has been modestly successful in raising
incomes for those who work. We illustrate what selected states have
done in three key areas – mandating work, making work pay, and
helping with child care – that contribute to these successes to date.
However, many lone mothers, who are not able to find and keep
jobs, are worse off financially as a result of the reforms. Many others are
no better off financially – they have simply moved from the ranks of the
welfare poor to the working poor. In many states, a single mother with a
pre-school age child is expected to work at least 30 hours per week, at a
minimum wage job with only a modest amount of child care subsidy
and EITC and health insurance only for her children.
Thus, the picture from the states is mixed. Welfare to work
programs, programs to make work pay, and child care subsidies have
contributed to the increased employment of lone mothers. However,
lone mothers and their children remain at high risk of poverty and
hardship.
These results suggest that countries that are willing to end the
entitlement to cash assistance, and accept some increases in hardship,
can look to the US as a model for increasing the employment of lone
mothers. Other countries, however, might derive a different lesson and
choose to both increase employment and reduce financial hardship.
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Following this path requires a range of policies and services, not yet
available in the US, that would more completely transform a cash-based
safety net into a work-based safety net. For the most part, even though
the American states have, since PRWORA, done a better job making
work pay and helping families with child care, they have not done
enough to provide work opportunities and social services for those who
have been unable to find steady work in the best labor market in three
decades.
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